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Abstract: 
International law prohibits slavery and slavery-like practices under treaties that have been in 
force for more than a century. Yet, contemporary forms of slavery are one of the prevailing 
challenges for the international community, with 40.3 million people in modern slavery on any 
given day in 2016. The State has been largely overlooked as a perpetrator or accomplice in the 
global movement to eradicate modern slavery. The hand of the State can however be found in 
contemporary cases of modern slavery. This article identifies five scenarios of state 
involvement in modern slavery and aims to uncover and bridge the responsibility gap.  
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The State – an abstract entity 1 and legal fiction2 - has been largely overlooked as a perpetrator 
or accomplice in the global movement to eradicate modern slavery. Yet the hand of the State 
can be found in contemporary cases of modern slavery. The United States has apparently 
granted export credit to a national company3 participating in the construction of the Bisha mine 
in Eritrea, a project for which a Canadian mining company, Nevsun Resources Limited, is said 
to be complicit in the forced labour and torture allegedly inflicted on Eritrean nationals working 
on the construction of the mine.4 In the United Kingdom, the apparently private exploitation of 
domestic servants by wealthy households starts to implicate the State when the perpetrator is a 
diplomatic agent representing his State overseas.5  
International law prohibits slavery and slavery-like practices under treaties that have 
been in force for more than a century. The International Court of Justice recognized the 
peremptory nature of the prohibition of slavery and the slave trade nearly half-century ago.6 
Yet, contemporary forms of slavery are one of the prevailing challenges for the international 
community, with 40.3 million people in modern slavery on any given day in 2016.7  
The policy term ‘modern slavery’ is used to refer to contemporary forms of slavery, 
including slavery, servitude, human trafficking, forced labour and child labour. For the 
purposes of this article, modern slavery covers: a) slavery, servitude and institutions and 
practices similar to slavery, as defined by the 1926 Slavery Convention and the 1956 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery; b) human trafficking, as defined by the Palermo Protocol; c) 
forced labour, as defined in the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Protocol on Forced 
Labour; and d) child labour, as defined in the ILO 1999 Convention on Worst Forms of Child 
Labour and in accordance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.8  
Aware of the gravity of this situation, States committed to eradicate modern slavery as 
part of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda (Sustainable Development Goal ‘SDG’ 
Target 8.7)9. As most modern slavery offences are committed by non-state actors (‘NSAs’)10 
such as transnational criminal networks involved in human trafficking and corporations 
exploiting workers in their supply chains, States’ efforts have focused on preventing, protecting 
                                                     
 
1 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Judgement of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, 1 October 1946, 
Trial, Vol. I. 
2 J Vidmar, ‘The Concept of the State and its Right of Existence’ (2015) 4 Cambridge International Law Journal 
547. 
3 E Garcia, ‘US has provided $315m in financing to supplier of mines accused of slave labor’ The Guardian (22 
February 2017. 
4 Nevsun Resources Ltd. v Gize Yebeyo Araya et al., Supreme Court of Canada, pending. 
5 Reyes v Al-Malki [2017] UKSC. 
6 Vienna Conference, Yearbook, 1966, vol. II, at 247; Barcelona Traction case, Light and Power Co, Ltd. (Belgium 
v Spain), ICJ Reports 1971, 5 February 1971, 32. 
7 ILO, Walk Free Foundation, Global Estimate of Modern Slavery (September 2017). The estimation excluding 
forced marriage amounts to 24.9 million people. 
8 Certain forms of forced labour are exempt from the prohibition of the ILO Convention (prison labour, emergency 
assistance, military assistance and communal duties). The scope of this article does not include forced marriage 
or prison labour. 
9 Sustainable Development Target 8.7: ‘Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end 
modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child 
labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms’. 
10 For the purposes of this article, ‘non-state actors’ are ‘all actors who are not the State’ (ILA Committee on non-
state actors, Rio Report (2008), at 2). As more recent work of the ILA Committee highlights, there is no consensus 




and prosecuting with due diligence the offences committed by NSAs.11 While acknowledging 
that this focus on positive obligations is necessary, this article identifies a gap in the 
international response to modern slavery: it overlooks the responsibility of States themselves 
for involvement in modern slavery.12  
State involvement in the commission of modern slavery occurs through State policy or 
through the actions or omissions of a State organ or official or of private entities exercising 
public functions. If that involvement amounts to a breach of a State’s international obligations, 
the law of State responsibility provides mechanisms to hold it accountable. This article 
challenges the current focus on NSAs and aims at uncovering and bridging the existing 
responsibility gap.  
The article proceeds in three parts. Part 1 analyses existing evidence and identifies five 
factual scenarios of State involvement in modern slavery that could give rise to State 
responsibility. Part 2 addresses the main challenges of this approach, including plausible 
deniability by States and implications for victims, and examines how the international law of 
State responsibility applies to modern slavery, unpacking its potential for advancing efforts to 
eradicate it. Part 3 presents legal policy recommendations that have been developed in 
consultation with representatives of States, international organisations and civil society, 
practitioners and academics specialising in international law and modern slavery. 
I. STATE INVOLVEMENT IN MODERN SLAVERY: THE ILLUSION OF 
ABOLITION? 
State involvement in modern slavery remains a small portion of the overall number of cases.13 
However, there are credible reports of pervasive State involvement in the commission of 
modern slavery offences. That reality must be confronted in order to advance towards the 
elimination of slavery in all its forms and avoid ‘the illusion of abolition’ created by the 
longstanding prohibition of slavery in international instruments.14  
The analysis of evidence indicates that certain practices and policies of some States 
could amount to a breach of the prohibition of slavery, forced labour and human trafficking15 
and constitute an internationally wrongful act entailing international responsibility under the 
2001 International Law Commission Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (‘ARSIWA’). The conduct of state organs (including individuals or entities)16 
may also involve the state in a modern slavery situation. Even non-state entities exercising 
public powers could implicate the state if they engage in an activity tainted by modern slavery. 
                                                     
 
11 This is the focus of the Anti-Slavery acts in the UK, Australia and California, as well as of the 2017 French law 
on the Duty of Vigilance. On the due diligence standard, see also UNCHR, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences’ (2017) UN Doc A/HRC/36/43, at 5. 
12 Research developed for the project [anonymised].  
13 Of the 24.9 million victims of forced labour in 2016, 16 million were in the private sector, another 4.8 million 
were in forced sexual exploitation, and 4.1 million were in forced labour imposed by State authorities (Global 
Estimates of Modern Slavery (n 8), at 10).  
14 BK Freamon, Possessed by the Right Hand: The Problem of Slavery in Islamic Law and Muslim Cultures (Brill 
2019), chapter 9: ‘The Illusion of Abolition’, 439-463. 
15 1926 Slavery Convention, 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and 
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons 
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime, and 1930 ILO Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour. 
16 Art 4 ARSIWA includes organs (entities or individuals) of the central, regional or local government, exercising 
whatever functions (legislative, executive or judicial organs) (J Crawford, The International Law Commission’s 
Articles on State Responsibility. Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge University Press 2002), at 41, 




Employment agencies or export credit agencies, some of which are private or semi-public 
entities, are examples. 
Based on the analysis of reports from international organisations, relevant case law and 
studies by experts working on the frontline, we have identified five scenarios identifying 
varying levels of state involvement in modern slavery. They range from the most direct 
involvement (scenario 1) to the more indirect forms of assistance (scenario 5). 
A. Scenario 1: Modern Slavery as State Policy 
There is evidence of human trafficking and forced labour cases arising from state policy. 
Forced labour has been used to achieve production quotas in state-managed industries, or to 
generate funds for the state. Confiscation of passports and the use of threats and violence are 
common in these contexts. Other states may be aware or even complicit as destinations for the 
trafficked workers or through trade agreements. 
Uzbekistan17 and Turkmenistan18 have both been accused of using forced labour in the 
state-controlled cotton harvesting industry. Those states allegedly force national ministry 
employees (such as medical professionals and teachers), as well as students, to participate in 
cotton picking under quota systems and menace of penalty. Working conditions are harsh, pay 
is poor and sometimes withheld, and there are reports of punishments if quotas are not met.  
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (‘DPRK’) government is alleged to engage in 
human trafficking of its own nationals for forced labour.19 It is said to conclude bilateral 
contracts with foreign governments for trafficking DPRK nationals to work overseas in the 
fishing, construction or textile industries. Those trafficked workers are allegedly subject to 
extreme working conditions under significant coercive control, have their passports confiscated 
and their wages paid directly to the North Korean regime.20 Some of the reported receiving 
countries are Russia, China, Mongolia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (‘UAE’), Qatar, 
Angola or Poland.21  
B. Scenario 2: Participation of State Organs or Officials in Modern Slavery 
There is evidence of the active participation or cooperation of public officials in the smuggling 
and exploitation of migrants by private companies, or in the deployment of forced labour at the 
local and national level. Those practices usually involve physical abuse, withholding of wages 
and confiscation of passports. The state may not even be aware, but the action could still be 
attributable to it. 
Evidence on the involvement of public officials in modern slavery cases is abundant. 
In Myanmar, where the 2008 Constitution prohibited forced labour leaving behind the era of 
its systematic use as state practice,22 certain state authorities have informally resisted pressure 
                                                     
 
17 ILO, ‘Child Labour in Cotton’ (2016) 12; ILO, ‘Third-party monitoring of measures against child labour and 
forced labour during the 2015 cotton harvest in Uzbekistan’ (2018), at 13, para 41. 
18 UNCHR, ‘Concluding Observations on the second periodic report of Turkmenistan’ (2017) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/TKM/CO/2, paras 26-27. The same concern was shared by the ILO Committee of Experts (ILO, 
‘Individual Case (CAS) – Discussion: 2016’ (2016)). 
19 US Department of State, ‘Trafficking in Persons Report’ (2015). 
20 R Breuker, ‘North Korean Forced Labour in the EU, the Polish Case: How the supply of a captive DPRK 
workforce fits our demand for cheap labour’ (2016) Leiden Asia Center; R Breuker, IBLH Van Gardingen, People 
for Profits: North Korean Forced Labour on a Global Scale (Leiden Asia Center, 2018). 
21 CH Shin, MH Go, Beyond the UN COI Report on Human Rights in DPRK (The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 
2014), at 21. 
22 ILO, ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed under Article 26 of the Constitution of the ILO to examine 




from the International Labour Organization to reform forced labour practices23 and continue 
imposing it ‘not as part of an official policy, but in violation of it’.24 In March 2018, there were 
allegations of the tatmadaw forcing villagers, especially in Rakhine state, to engage in 
portering, act as guides and human shields, tend military-owned fields and maintain military 
infrastructure.25  
In Thailand, modern slavery conditions have been reported in the fishing industry 
where, despite recent changes in the domestic legislation, enforcement continues to be an 
issue26 partly due to the involvement of public officials in the smuggling of migrants from 
Myanmar or Cambodia, their recruitment process and the facilitation of exploitation by fishing 
companies, frequently subjecting them to forced labour, physical abuse, withholding of wages 
and confiscation of Seafarer Identification Documents.27 
Another common example is the complicity of border guards or immigration officials 
who facilitate human trafficking. It has been reported that in certain land borders labour 
recruiters bribe immigration officials to allow labour trafficking victims to leave the country 
and in some cases, as on both sides of the Indo-Bangladesh border, law enforcement agencies 
procure tokens to traffickers, allowing them to cross the border back and forth unhindered.28  
Eritrean officials are alleged to be involved in human trafficking. The UN monitoring Group 
reporting on the UN Security Council’s sanctions against Eritrea collected evidence showing that sums 
extorted from victims of human trafficking were paid to agents of the Eritrean government who were 
allegedly trafficking people to Sudan, Egypt and Israel.29 In China, in the last decade the black kiln 
scandal unveiled the involvement of local officials in the trafficking of persons to the kilns, where they 
were held in conditions that could amount to slavery.30 Coercion by local governmental schools for 
students to accept forced internships has also been reported.31  
C. Scenario 3: Diplomatic Involvement in Domestic Servitude 
Migrant domestic workers employed in diplomatic households constitute one of the groups 
most vulnerable to modern slavery.32 They may be subject to exploitation, have their passport 
confiscated and be subject to physical, psychological and sexual abuse by public officials with 
                                                     
 
23 K MacLean, ‘Lawfare and impunity in Burma since the 2000 ban on forced labour (2012) 36 Asian Studies 
Review. 
24 R Horsey, Ending Forced Labour in Myanmar: Engaging a Pariah Regime (Routledge 2011), at 185. 
25 UN, ‘Fact-finding Mission on Myanmar: concrete and overwhelming information points to international 
crimes’, 12 March 2018. 
26 ILO, EU, ‘Ship to Shore Rights: Baseline research findings on fishers and seafood workers in Thailand’ (2018). 
27 ILO, ‘Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Thailand of 
the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No 29), made under Article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the International 
Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) and the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF)’ (2017), at 14-15. 
See also scenario 4, for the involvement of employment agencies in this type of recruitment. 
28 IBA, ‘Human Trafficking and Public Corruption. A Report by the IBA’s Presidential Task Force Against 
Human Trafficking’ (2016), at 25-26. 
29 ‘Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 (2012): 
Eritrea’, UN Doc S/2013/440 (2013), Annex, paras 137-144, ‘Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and 
Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011)’, UN Doc S/2012/545 (2002), paras 77-86.  
30 I Franceschini, Cronache dalle fornaci cinesi (Chronicles from the Chinese Kilns) (Cafoscarina 2009). 
31 SACOM, ‘Apple Watch 3 – Exploit Student Workers Further an Investigative Report on Apple Watch’s 
Exclusive Manufacturer’ (2018). 
32 J Ewins, ‘Independent Review of the Overseas Domestic Workers Visa, Final Report’ (2015), paras 8-29, at 
41-42; Reyes and Al-Malki and (1) Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (2) Kalayaan, case 
for Kalayaan, Supreme Court of the United Kingdom on Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Civil), 




diplomatic status.33 And their avenues of legal redress are severely restricted by the bar of 
diplomatic immunity.34 
Finding a way out of those abuses is a challenge for victims, exacerbated in many cases 
by the domestic legal system of receiving states, which may restrict the right to change 
employer or residence rights. Visas of overseas domestic workers in diplomatic households are 
typically tied to the employer’s diplomatic status and are only valid so long as they remain employed 
by the diplomatic agent.35 In addition, many countries do not allow private domestic workers to change 
employer before the termination of the contract, a restriction that has been used in some cases as a tool 
to pressure the worker and increase his/her vulnerability.36  
The kafala system in certain Gulf states may require the employer’s permission for the 
worker to leave their job and even the country, leaving domestic workers outside the protection 
of labour law and allowing their ‘sponsors’ to evade social security and medical costs.37 Certain 
promising practices in some of these Gulf states show their acknowledgement of a need for 
change. Kuwait and the UAE introduced a unified standard domestic worker’s contract (2006, 2007) 
and Oman introduced in 2011 a pilot contract for the employment of house maids. However, 
implementation remains a challenge and the scope of some of those reforms does not include 
domestic workers.38 An example of this is a new law that will allow the majority of migrant workers 
to leave Qatar without permission from their employers but does not cover migrant domestic workers.39 
The situation of victims is even more precarious in accessing justice due to the 
extensive scope of diplomatic immunity.40 While diplomatic involvement in this form of 
modern slavery has become increasingly visible through court proceedings and thanks to the 
work of organisations protecting the victims in States such as the United Kingdom, the United 
States or Australia, when the victims manage to escape and bring a claim against a diplomat, 
diplomatic immunity from jurisdiction may restrict the possibilities of redress.  
D. Scenario 4: State-backed Labour Brokerage Practices Facilitating Human Trafficking 
Recruitment agencies act as intermediaries matching workers in one country to jobs in another. 
This growth in the use of these agencies started with the facilitation of migration from Asian 
countries to the Gulf, and has now become a globalized feature of labour markets.41 Some of 
the methods employed by these agencies are abusive and increase workers’ vulnerability to 
human trafficking and forced labour.42 Certain practices, such as collection of excessive and 
                                                     
 
33 UNCHR, ‘Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, including its causes and 
consequences’ (2010) UN Doc A/HRC/15/20, para 23. 
34 UNCHR, ‘Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, including its causes and 
consequences’ (2018) UN Doc A/HRC/39/52, para 37. 
35 OSCE, ‘How to Prevent Human Trafficking for Domestic Servitude in Diplomatic Households and Protect 
Private Domestic Workers’ (Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combatting Trafficking in 
Human Beings 2014), at 14. 
36 Ibid, at 36. 
37 R Bajracharya, B Sijapati, ‘The Kafala System and Its Implications for Nepali Domestic Workers’ (2012) 
CESLAM Policy Brief. 
38Ibid, at 4. 
39 P Webb, R Garciandia, ‘Slavery in Domestic Work: The Potential for State Responsibility?’ (17 September 
2018) EJIL: Talk!, Blog of the European Journal of International Law. 
40 UN Doc A/HRC/39/52 (n 34), para 37. 
41 ILO, ‘Fair migration. Setting an ILO agenda’ (2015) Report of the Director General, at 15, para 85; B 
Farbenblum, ‘Governance of Migrant Worker Recruitment: A Rights-Based Framework for Countries of Origin’ 
(2017) 7 Asian Journal of International Law 1. 
42 IOM, ‘IOM, IOE join forces to combat unethical recruitment of migrant workers’ (2014); ILO, ‘Profits and 
Poverty: The Economics of Forced Labour’ (2014); Verité, ‘Corruption and Labour Trafficking in Global Supply 




sometimes extortionate recruitment fees,43 are legal but may lead to debt bondage and other 
forms of modern slavery.44 Other practices, such as deliberate misinformation and deception 
concerning the nature and pay and conditions of the work that is on offer,45 threats, 
intimidation, retention of identity documents and physical or sexual violence,46 are ‘abusive 
and fraudulent’47 and may in certain cases amount to modern slavery offences. Access to means 
of redress in face of unscrupulous intermediaries is very limited once migrant workers arrive 
at their destinations and problems become apparent.48  
Following initiatives of the ILO, IOM and the International Organisation of Employers 
(IOE) to promote fair and ethical recruitment of migrant workers,49 States are adopting 
measures to combat abusive labour recruitment and to promote fair recruitment practices 
globally and across specific migration corridors in North Africa, the Middle East and South 
Asia.50 Yet, the problem persists in many countries where those practices used by employment 
agencies, which are regulated, licensed or owned by the State, put migrants at risk of trafficking 
and forced labour. In addition, certain State policies (such as visa and deportation policies, 
language requirements, job portability) can also increase vulnerability of migrant workers to 
modern slavery. 
In the Philippines, despite former governments’ efforts to establish a comprehensive 
system of regulation and licensing of employment agencies,51 deceptive and abusive 
recruitment practices persist in certain areas and enforcement remains weak.52 In the Thai 
seafood industry, most workers are hired through irregular channels, such as informal referrals, 
or as walk-in applicants, without going through the legal immigration and labour procedures.53 
Most workers access Thailand through an intermediary who facilitates their transport and entry 
to the country for a fee. Some also paid intermediaries who link them with employers. 
Inhumane conditions during transport are usually reported, using overcrowded vehicles where 
people were ‘piled’, sleeping or sitting on top of each other.54 
Corruption is one of the main challenges in this scenario. The bribery of public officials 
by labour brokers to ensure that they turn a blind eye has been reported as a common practice 
                                                     
 
Migration’ (2016); Verité, ‘The Cost of a Job: Systematic Forced Labor in Asia and What Companies Can Do to 
Eliminate It’ (2015). 
43 ILO, Fair migration (n 41); UNODC, ‘The Role of Recruitment Fees and Abusive and Fraudulent Recruitment 
Practices of Recruitment Agencies in Trafficking in Persons’ (2015).  
44 The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the work of the ILO in this area provide a solid 
basis for improvements. 
45 ILO, Fair migration (n 41). 
46 B Andrees et al., ‘Regulating labour recruitment to prevent human trafficking and to foster fair 
migration: Models, challenges and opportunities’ (2015), at 10-11.  
47 Term established in the ILO Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No 181).  
48 ILO, Fair migration (n 41). 
49 The ILO launched its Fair Recruitment Initiative and IOM and the IOE launched an international initiative to 
promote ethical recruitment of migrant workers through a voluntary certification process. 
50 ILO Integrated Programme on Fair Recruitment (FAIR) and Global Action to Improve the Recruitment 
Framework of Labour Migration (REFRAME). 
51 Key national legislation was adopted under the governments of Fidel Ramos in 1995 (Migrant Workers and 
Overseas Filipinos Act, Republic Act No 8042), and Gloria Arroyo in 2007 (Philippine Overseas Employment 
Administration Act, Republic Act No 9422) and in 2009 (Amendment Act, Republic Act No 10022). 
52ILO, ‘Fair share? International recruitment in the Philippines’ (2017).  
53 Verité, ‘A Verité Assessment of Recruitment Practices and Migrant Labor Conditions in Nestlé’s Thai Shrimp 
Supply Chain. An Examination of Forced Labor and other Human Rights Risks Endemic to the Thai Seafood 
Sector’ (2015), at 14.  




in countries such as Nepal.55 Beyond petty corruption, negotiation and implementation of some 
government-to-government memoranda of understanding (MoUs) has been reported as 
arbitrary and corrupt.56 In some cases, restrictions placed by countries of origin on the type of 
work that migrants can do abroad lead to MoUs for manufacturing or construction, and not for 
fishers and domestic workers,57 increasing the risk of trafficking in the non-regulated 
industries.58 In addition, corruption may be entrenched in the execution of those agreements 
and the complex MoU process may discourage migrants to use regular avenues for migration. 
In the Myanmar to Malaysia migration corridor, for example, ‘under-the-table’ payments 
beyond ‘several thousand’ per worker are allegedly required at the Ministry of Labour offices 
to secure approval of the foreign employer and exit visas for selected workers.59 
E. Scenario 5: States Funding Modern Slavery Through Export Credit Agencies 
States could be funding projects tainted by modern slavery through the loans, insurance and 
guarantees executed by national export credit agencies (‘ECAs’). Many of these agencies, 
which facilitate exports or investments of private companies in foreign countries assuming the 
high costs associated to those operations,60 do not have mechanisms in place to assess the 
human rights and social impact of those projects. Only very few States ‘explicitly consider 
human rights criteria in their export credit’.61 
Companies receiving this kind of support from their home institutions may engage in 
investments or economic activity tainted by slavery, forced labour, child labour or human 
trafficking. In these circumstances, the State may incur international responsibility for 
breaching its obligations under international law. An example of the need for human rights 
monitoring is the credit provided by EXIM, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, to a 
US company providing equipment to the Bisha Mine,62 in the construction of which the 
Eritrean National Service Programme allegedly deployed forced labour.  
An interesting development, although not on modern slavery but in relation to social 
and human rights impact more generally, is the withdrawal of the British ECA in 2006, and 
then of the Austrian, German and Swiss ECAs in 2009, from the Ilisu Dam project in Turkey. 
The withdrawal was precipitated by serious social, cultural and environmental risks such as 
displacement of those living in the area and potential destruction of an antient town considered 
part of the region’s cultural heritage. It was the first project to have export credit guarantees 
from European governments withdrawn after the guarantees had been agreed.63 
                                                     
 
55 In Nepal, the exchange of information and interaction between labour brokers and the Department of Foreign 
Employment had generated by 2010 an estimated 194.7 billion USD of bribery or corruption payments (S 
Manandhar, J Adhikari, ‘Study of Issues on the Recruitment of Migrant Labour in Nepal, submitted to the World 
Bank Country Office’ (2010)).  
56 Verité, Freedom Fund (n 42).  
57 ILO, ‘Review of the effectiveness of the MOUs in managing labour migration between Thailand and 
neighbouring countries’ (2016). 
58 Ibid, at 24. 
59 Verité, Freedom Fund (n 42), at 16. 
60That cost corresponds to the political and commercial risks, currency exposure, cross-cultural risk and financial 
risk of certain projects (M Sant’Anna, ‘Enabling Risky Business: Human Rights and the Role of Officially 
Supported Trade Finance and Investment Guarantees’ (2013) International Institute for Sustainable Development; 
A Klasen, ‘The Role of Export Credit Agencies in Global Trade’ (2011) 2 Global Policy 2. 
61 UNCHR, ‘Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability 
for Corporate Acts’, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary general on the issue of human rights 
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises (2007) UN Doc A/HRC/4/035, para 17. 
62 Araya v Nevsun Resources Ltd. case, 2017 British Columbia Court of Appeal 401.  




On the supranational level, the European Ombudsman determined in July 2018 that the 
European Commission had wrongly decided not to carry out a human rights impact assessment 
before agreeing to the 2015 Sector Understanding on Export Credits for coal-fired electricity 
generation projects, negotiated in the context of the OECD Arrangement on Officially 
Supported Export Credits. The Ombudsman cited maladministration on the part of the 
Commission for having taken this decision in the absence of a thorough analysis of whether it 
was likely there would be any significant economic, social or environmental impact, including 
on human rights.64  
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY: A FOCUS ON 
MODERN SLAVERY 
International law imposes obligations of a diverse nature on States in the area of modern 
slavery. The breach of those obligations can give rise to the liability of the State by virtue of 
the principles of State responsibility codified by ARSIWA.65 As Boon has indicated, the 
problem of slavery was well known to the drafters of the Articles on State Responsibility, and 
it is frequently invoked in the commentaries, including as an example of a jus cogens and an 
erga omnes obligation.66  
A. Challenges of Uncovering and Bridging the Gap in Accountability for Modern Slavery 
Looking at the involvement of the State in modern slavery through the lens of ARSIWA, there 
are three main challenges for unpacking the potential of the law of State responsibility to tackle 
modern slavery more effectively.  
First, there is the plausible deniability of States. States may point to the prohibition of 
slavery in their legislation (or even their constitution) as sufficient evidence that they are not 
involved in such practices. Former UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery 
Gulnara Sahinian reported in 2014 after a country visit to Mauritania that some officials denied 
the existence of slavery stating that because Mauritania had legally abolished and criminalized 
slavery,67 it therefore no longer existed as an institution. These officials spoke of ‘the remnants 
of slavery or vestiges of slavery which exist as a result of poverty’,68 denying any role for the 
State. 
States may also characterize their own involvement in modern slavery as benevolent 
sponsorship,69 military service,70 community work or just isolated cases of corrupt officials.71 
Attempts to cover modern slavery as lawful practices or to blame a ‘rogue’ public official are 
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common and constitute an obstacle to advancing the efforts against modern slavery. A State 
may not want to acknowledge publicly its limited capacity to enforce anti-slavery legislation 
or its insufficient mechanisms to control corrupt officials. In other cases, a recent history of 
chattel-slavery may lead to understanding certain patronising slavery-like practices as 
beneficial and may drive public institutions, including the executive, the judiciary and police 
officers to turn a blind eye to those practices, failing to tackle them effectively. These attitudes 
and approaches, which could be considered ‘epistemic vices’ using Cassam’s terminology,72 
must be confronted as they constitute an obstacle to tackling the problem and could ultimately 
give rise to State responsibility.  
Second, most efforts against slavery are focused on the rights of victims, and the law 
of State responsibility may not seem to be the most immediate and effective avenue for securing 
redress for victims. But the potential of State responsibility as a tool is not limited to its mere 
invocation or the adoption of countermeasures, although those remain important aspects. It can 
also contribute to raising awareness of State obligations and the need to uphold those 
obligations in order to avoid the potential consequences of a breach. In this regard, as Jägers 
has noted, ‘the law of State responsibility offers an interesting, yet underutilized tool for 
addressing human rights violations’.73 Human rights courts are starting to apply certain 
principles of the international law of state responsibility to modern slavery cases, holding states 
to account. Landmark cases in this regard are the Hacienda Brasil Verde case before the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, the Mani case before the ECOWAS Court, and the Siliadin 
and Rantsev cases before the ECHR.74  
Third, the state responsibility approach may have unintended consequences for victims 
and for the dynamics of modern slavery. Protection of victims must be a priority in the design 
of any accountability strategy. Equally relevant is the impact that accountability mechanisms 
could have in the trends and dynamics of modern slavery. As some states have not ratified all 
the existing conventions and treaties relevant to modern slavery, holding a state party 
accountable could leave a space open for non-states parties to engage in modern slavery, 
indirectly aggravating the problem. An interesting case in this regard is the increasing presence 
of Chinese companies in the Eritrean mining sector, which is plagued by allegations of forced 
labour.75 In 2012, Australian based Chalice Gold Mines sold its 60 per cent stake of the Koka 
gold mine to a Chinese company,76 and in 2019 the Chinese Sichuan Road & Bridge Company 
will start producing copper, zinc, gold and silver at another mine in Eritrea. Both investments 
have been funded via a preferential loan from the Chinese government.77  
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In response to this argument, which has also been raised in relation to extraterritorial 
human rights obligations in the context of foreign investment,78 two considerations must be 
taken into account. First, the jus cogens nature of the prohibition of slavery and slave trade 
allows for the invocation of international responsibility of a state which has not ratified the 
relevant treaties. Second, as in all areas of international law, state consent remains at the core 
of international obligations of states and, the lack of an equally binding obligation for all 
sovereign states should not undermine the validity of the obligations that some states have 
accepted. The fact that one state may not have ratified a convention should not prevent 
international law from holding other states to account of its respective international obligations. 
Those potential unintended collateral effects must encourage the design of transparent 
monitoring systems that provide assurances to states and businesses and allow them to operate 
respecting human rights. 
B. Which Violations of International Obligations Could Give Rise to State Responsibility 
for Modern Slavery? 
According to Article 2 of ARSIWA, there is an internationally wrongful act of a state when the 
conduct consisting of an act or omission a) constitutes a breach of an international obligation 
of the state; and b) is attributable to the state under international law.  
1. International obligations  
Under Article 12 ARSIWA, ‘there is a breach of an international obligation by a state when an 
act of that state is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of 
its origin or character’. These obligations may arise by a treaty or under customary international 
law,79 ‘whatever the nature of the obligation it has failed to respect’.80  The international legal 
framework creates two types of obligations for States related to modern slavery: the so-called 
‘positive obligations’, which include preventing, protecting and punishing modern slavery 
offences and the obligation not to commit or facilitate those offences. 
a) Positive obligations: preventing, protecting and punishing slavery 
The 1926 and 1956 Slavery Conventions oblige States to abolish slavery and to criminalize 
slavery and institutions and practices similar to slavery, such as debt bondage, serfdom, forced 
marriage or child exploitation.81 States’ obligations in relation to human trafficking, forced 
labour and child labour are contained in ILO and UN Conventions and human rights treaties.82 
In addition, international human rights law obliges States to prevent, protect and punish slavery 
offences committed by NSAs,83 in provisions protecting the rights of individuals not to be 
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subject to slavery or servitude,84 not to be subject to inhumane or degrading treatment85 or the 
right to just and favourable conditions of work.86 States are also obliged to cooperate with each 
other and with the United Nations to give effect to the 1956 Supplementary Convention.  
b) The prohibition on the commission of slavery 
Those obligations to prevent and punish necessarily imply the prohibition of the commission 
of slavery, forced labour and human trafficking by the State, following the reasoning of the 
International Court of Justice on the prohibition on genocide.87 In the Bosnia Genocide case, 
the ICJ emphasized that, although Article 1 of the Genocide Convention does not expressly 
require States to refrain from themselves committing genocide, speaking only of prevention, 
‘it would be paradoxical if the parties had an obligation to prevent acts of genocide under 
Article 1 but were not forbidden to commit such acts through their own organs, or persons over 
whom they had effective control, where such conduct may be attributable to them’.88 The Court 
stated clearly that ‘the obligation to prevent genocide necessarily implies the prohibition of the 
commission of genocide’.89 The reasoning of the Court on the prohibition of genocide can 
apply by analogy to slavery, forced labour, human trafficking and child labour.  
2. Attribution of the breach to the State 
If the obligation to respect the prohibition of slavery or the positive obligations mentioned in 
section a) are breached and such breach is attributable to the State, the violation will constitute 
an internationally wrongful act. The rules for attribution for the five factual scenarios described 
above are detailed in chapter II of ARSIWA. 
a) Conduct of State organs or officials  
Most of the breaches of obligations that may occur under the five factual scenarios would be 
attributable to the State under Article 4 of ARSIWA, as they are committed by State organs or 
officials. Under Article 4 of ARSIWA, ‘the conduct of any State organ shall be considered an 
act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, 
judicial or any other functions’ notwithstanding the position and character (national, regional 
or local) of that organ in the internal organization of the State. According to this provision, 
decisions by State organs or officials committing or facilitating modern slavery, as well as 
failing to prevent, protect and punish modern slavery, could give rise to State responsibility.  
In many slavery-related cases where conduct occurred with the complicity or 
involvement of a State, it is a State organ who engages in the conduct. For example, in the 
Uzbek cotton harvesting industry in which forced labour is allegedly deployed, numerous 
major government organizations, including national enterprises, utility companies, banks, 
factories, law enforcement, and government agencies, require their employees to pick cotton 
or pay for replacement pickers. Further, the 1998 Report of the ILO Commission of Inquiry 
into Issues of Forced Labour in Myanmar found ‘abundant evidence’ of the ‘pervasive use of 
forced labour imposed on the civilian population throughout Myanmar by the authorities and 
the military’.90  
                                                     
 
84 Art 4 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Art 8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR). 
85 Art 7 ICCPR.  
86 Art 7 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  
87 Application of the Genocide Convention, ICJ Reports 2007, paras. 166-179. 
88 Ibid, para 166. 
89 Ibid, para 166. See also Gowlland-Debas, ‘The ICJ and the Challenges of Human Rights Law’, in M Adenas 
and E Bjorge (Eds.), A Farewell to Fragmentation. Reassertion and Convergence in International Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2015) 109, at 132. 




As regards employment agencies and ECAs (scenarios 4 and 5 discussed above), their 
legal nature varies from public or quasi-public to private entities. ECAs act under a mandate 
from their government and employment agencies under a regulation or licence issued by the 
government. If the ECA or employment agency is a public entity, its acts or omissions are 
attributable to the State under Article 4 of ARSIWA.91 If it is a semi-public or private entity, 
its acts or omissions may still be attributable to the State under Articles 5 or 8 ARSIWA (see 
sub-section ii). 
In certain cases, the State may claim that its official was disobeying instructions by 
committing modern slavery. In Uzbekistan, Deputy Prime Minister Zoyir Mirzayev was 
dismissed in October 2018 over a scandal involving the public humiliation of a group of 
farmers conscripted to pick cotton.92 Article 7 of ARSIWA makes clear, in line with 
international jurisprudence and general principles of international law, that ultra vires acts of 
State organs, persons or entities acting in their official capacity are attributable to the State.93 
This is the case ‘even where the organ or entity in question has overtly committed unlawful 
acts under the cover of its official status or has manifestly exceeded its competence. It is so 
even if other organs of the State have disowned the conduct in question’.94 Otherwise, ‘one 
would end by authorizing abuse, for in most cases there would be no practical way of proving 
that the agent had or had not acted on orders received’.95  
Evidence gathering under this provision poses challenges in discerning the line between 
an act in an official capacity and an act. The Mixed Commission in the Mossé case noted that 
even if an official was acting outside the statutory limits of the competence of their service, it 
would still be necessary to consider ‘whether in the international order the State should be 
acknowledged [as] responsible for acts performed by officials within the apparent limits of 
their functions, in accordance with a line of conduct which was not entirely contrary to the 
instructions received’.96  
For the purposes of Article 4, in case the internal law of a State does not classify - 
exhaustively or at all - which entities are considered ‘organs’, the powers of an entity and its 
relationship to other bodies under internal law will be relevant. In addition, in some systems 
the status and functions of an entity are determined by a combination of law and practice,97 
creating a de facto organ.98 This rule of attribution was explained by the ICJ in the Bosnia v 
Serbia case, in which the Court referred to ‘persons or entities which are not formally 
recognized as official organs under internal law, but which must nevertheless be equated with 
State organs because they are in a relationship of “complete dependence” on the State’99. 
Referring to the Nicaragua judgment, the ICJ observed that ‘according to the Court’s 
jurisprudence, persons, groups of persons or entities may, for purposes of international 
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responsibility, be equated with State organs even if that status does not follow from internal 
law, provided that in fact the persons, groups or entities act in “complete dependence” on the 
State, of which they are ultimately merely the instrument. In such a case, it is appropriate to 
look beyond legal status alone, in order to grasp the reality of the relationship between the 
person taking action, and the State to which he is so closely attached as to appear to be nothing 
more than its agent: any other solution would allow States to escape their international 
responsibility by choosing to act through persons or entities whose supposed independence 
would be purely fictitious’.100 Attribution on this basis would only be on an exceptional basis, 
‘for it requires proof of a particularly great degree of State control over them’.101  
b) Conduct of other persons or entities exercising public functions  
The involvement in modern slavery of certain semi-public or private entities may be 
attributable to the State under Article 5. This encompasses certain ECAs or employment 
agencies (Scenarios 4 and 5) , private security firms empowered to act as prison guards, or 
private or State-owned airlines exercising immigration controls (Scenario 2).102  This type of 
attribution is potentially on the rise, with a wide range of public functions being increasingly 
outsourced to private actors.103 
Under Article 5 of ARSIWA, the conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of 
the State shall be attributable to the State if this person or entity is empowered by the law of 
that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority, and if it is acting in that 
capacity.104 The variety of entities to which a State can possibly delegate some of its functions 
include public corporations, semi-public entities, public agencies and even private 
companies.105  
In the Nevsun case,106 forced labour and torture were allegedly inflicted on military 
conscripts in the construction of the Bisha mine, owned by the Canadian company (60 per cent) 
and the Eritrean government (40 per cent). The construction was managed by a South African 
company which subcontracted two Eritrean companies (Segen and Mereb)107 under the 
framework of the Eritrean National Service Programme108. Those are the two companies 
allegedly deploying forced labour. Although it was not the State that directly subcontracted the 
companies and it is not clear whether the works done by the companies can be considered as 
‘elements of governmental authority’, the allegations of the connection of the companies with 
the Eritrean State and the claimants’ Statement that this programme provides labour to various 
companies owned by senior military officials provide elements of a situation to which Articles 
5 or 8 ARSIWA may apply.109    
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If the empowerment element of Article 5 is not found to be applicable on the facts, 
another possible basis for attribution would be Article 8 of ARSIWA, although there is no 
consensus on its customary nature. It must be shown that the conduct of persons or groups of 
persons acting (i) on the instructions of a State, or (ii) under the direction or control of that 
State shall be attributable to it.110 The first possibility, attribution on the basis of instructions, 
is widely accepted. It covers cases in which State organs supplement their action by recruiting, 
commissioning or instigating private persons or groups to act as ‘auxiliaries’ while remaining 
outside the official structure of the State.111 The second possibility, attribution on the basis of  
‘direction’ or ‘control’,112 involves domination and actual direction of an operation, not simply 
the exercise of oversight, influence or concern.113  
International case law provides guidance, with the ICJ confirming the ‘effective 
control’ test in the Bosnia Genocide case.114 As the Court indicated, in order to establish a 
factual basis for a person or entity to be responsible on grounds of direction or control, it must 
be shown that the ‘effective control’ was exercised ‘in respect of each operation in which the 
alleged violations occurred, not generally in respect of the overall actions taken by the persons 
or group of persons having committed the violations’.115 It must be proved that the State 
provided the direction or exercised control ‘over the action during which the wrong was 
committed’.116 However, the level of control required for attribution remains unclear, making 
necessary a flexible and fact-dependent view of what falls within a State’s control. The 
application of the effective control standard to certain questions, such as terrorism or the right 
to use of force in self-defence against non-state actors has been problematic, leading 
commentators and some tribunals to advocate for lower control thresholds.117 Various 
techniques have emerged to overcome those challenges and to adapt control thresholds, 
locating responsibility within omissions, the duty to prevent, or under the due diligence rule 
and articulating principles of shared responsibility.118 
c) Aid or assistance to another State 
A state may also be responsible for aiding or assisting other States in the commission of an 
internationally unlawful act under Article 16 of ARSIWA. There are three elements:119  
- the State must be aware of the circumstances making the conduct of the aided or assisted 
State internationally wrongful; 
- the aid or assistance is provided with the view to facilitating the commission of the 
internationally wrongful act, or is facilitating it; and 
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- the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by the State.120  
The acting state remains primarily responsible,121 but the aiding or assisting State will be 
responsible to the extent that its own conduct has caused or contributed to the internationally 
wrongful act.122  
Although the customary nature of this provision remains controversial, this rule could 
be particularly relevant in cases of human trafficking, an area where there is evidence of 
corruption and collusion between State officials and traffickers,123 as well as in some of the 
cases that fall under scenario 1 where, under certain circumstances, cases of assistance or aid 
of a State to another could emerge. Reception by UAE authorities of workers trafficked by the 
DPRK government could amount to aid or assistance if the requirements of ARSIWA are met.  
In the Campaign Against the Arms Trade case,124 Article 16 ARSIWA was tested in the English 
courts in the context of weapons sales to Saudi Arabia with onward use for unlawful acts in 
Yemen. The intervenor representing Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Rights 
Watch UK, argued that the Defendant, the UK Secretary of State for International Trade, had 
failed to consider the UK’s international obligations reflected in Article 16 ARSIWA. 
According to the intervenor, the sale and supply of weapons and military support from one 
State to another is a paradigm example of a situation where Article 16 may be engaged; the 
central question in interpreting and applying Article 16 is whether the assisting State has the 
requisite ‘knowledge of the circumstances’ of the internationally wrongful act.125 He stated that 
there is strong academic support for the proposition that ‘knowledge’ encompasses not just 
‘near-certainty’ or ‘something approaching practical certainty’, but also ‘wilful blindness’.126  
In order to explore this argument, the Court would have had to first establish whether 
Saudi Arabia had committed an internationally wrongful act.127 As this was beyond its 
functions, the claim was rejected.128 However, the test proposed by the intervenor suggests an 
approach that could contribute to a more systematic application of Article 16 ARSIWA to 
situations such as the reception by UAE authorities of workers trafficked by the DPRK 
government. The test would mean that knowledge or certainty of the trafficking would not be 
necessary for UAE to be responsible for aiding or assisting the DPRK in the trafficking. 
Turning a blind eye or ‘wilful blindness’ would suffice.129  
C. What is the Potential of the Law of State Responsibility to Tackle Modern Slavery More 
Effectively?  
The ARSIWA, many provisions of which reflect customary international law, provide an 
applicable set of secondary rules to apply when primary obligations regarding slavery are not 
respected.   
As mentioned above, it may be said that such legal framework is not beneficial for 
victims because it does not envisage an individual right of action, and individuals can only 
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obtain redress if a State decides to exercise diplomatic protection. While other mechanisms 
will allow for direct action by individuals,130 the potential of ARSIWA to overcome the gap 
identified in this article will ultimately benefit potential and actual victims by reducing their 
vulnerability, providing them a way out and adequate protection, and having a deterrent effect 
in perpetrators.131 And beyond the scenario of invoking the responsibility of a State for modern 
slavery, the application of ARSIWA to State involvement in modern slavery can enhance the 
fight against slavery in two ways: first, by encouraging States to uphold in practice what they 
have agreed to in international treaties; second, providing a valuable tool for States to put 
pressure on other states to change exploitative behaviour.  
1. Calling States to uphold their existing obligations in practice 
The analysis of evidence and of State obligations on modern slavery through the lens of 
ARSIWA, and consultation with modern slavery experts, indicate four avenues for maximising 
compliance with existing international legal obligations.  
The first avenue is to use existing international mechanisms to tackle modern slavery. 
States are bound by a complex framework of interconnected international obligations, 
including UN Conventions, ILO Conventions and international and regional human rights 
instruments which provide mechanisms to protect victims and to ensure redress and 
accountability, although some of those mechanisms are rarely used in the fight against slavery 
and in general in the protection of human rights. A good example is Article 24(c) of the Council 
of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking, which considers the involvement of 
public officials in the performance of their duty as an aggravating circumstance in the 
determination of the penalty for offences established in accordance with the Convention.132  
The second avenue is tackling corruption and enhancing monitoring over state-backed 
entities to avoid State responsibility. It is critical that States strengthen controls to identify 
corrupt officials and networks and prosecute corrupt officials. Otherwise, they may be 
responsible for failing to investigate and prosecute with due diligence. Corruption and lack of 
transparency has also been identified as a problem in government to government memoranda 
of understanding for migration of workers.133  
More generally, enhanced monitoring mechanisms and human rights due diligence are 
identified as desirable developments in the regulation of ECAs and employment agencies, since 
a lack of monitoring could lead some States to unknowingly sponsor or support slavery-tainted 
projects or practices.134 According to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, ‘States should take additional steps to protect against human rights abuses by business 
enterprises that are owned or controlled by the State, or that receive substantial support and 
services from State agencies such as export credit agencies and official investment insurance 
or guarantee agencies, including, where appropriate, by requiring human rights due 
diligence’.135 In 2012 the OECD adopted its Common Approaches for Officially Supported 
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Export Credits and Environmental and Social Due Diligence (‘the OECD Common 
Approaches’),136 amended in 2016 to explicitly include as potential social impacts of projects 
human trafficking, forced labour and child labour.137 
In line with the OECD Common Approaches, States are increasingly regulating ECAs’ 
obligation to assess the social impact of the projects they fund and some States and ECAs are 
actively looking for support to ensure the correct functioning of those assessments.138 
Nevertheless, those examples are still rare and there are circumstances in which impact 
assessments do not guarantee modern slavery-free investments and exports.139 In harmony with 
the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Common 
Approaches on ECAs, such enhanced monitoring would allow States to have more control over 
the activities in which they become involved.  
The third avenue is preventing vulnerability and ensuring a way out for victims. 
Regional human rights courts are holding States accountable for failing to prevent modern 
slavery and protect victims (their ‘positive obligations’). 140 States must uphold their policies 
and strategies to their obligation to prevent modern slavery, which includes any policies or 
decisions that may affect migrant women.141 A wider implementation of practices on 
prevention and protection of victims which have been successful in a selection of countries142 
would be desirable, accompanied by other measures such as enhanced labour inspections. In 
addition, visa and sponsorship regimes for overseas domestic workers have been identified as 
two policy areas with potential to ensure a way out for victims.143 Fair recruitment and the 
prohibition of recruitment fees and abusive recruitment practices is also of importance.  
The fourth avenue is ensuring that State or diplomatic immunity does not prevent 
victims from obtaining redress. A recent landmark case in this regard is Reyes v Al-Malki144, 
in which the UK Supreme Court considered the implications of human trafficking for the scope 
of diplomatic immunity.145 Although in this case the diplomat was not entitled to immunity as 
he was no longer in post,146 the Court referred in obiter dictum to the situation in which the 
diplomat would have been still in post, particularly to the applicability of the commercial 
exception to diplomatic immunity under Article 31(1)(c) of the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations. According to Lord Wilson, it can rationally be argued that ‘the relevant 
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“activity” is not just the so-called employment but the trafficking; that the employer of the 
migrant is an integral part of the chain, who knowingly effects the “receipt” of the migrant and 
supplies the specified purpose, namely that of exploiting her, which drives the entire exercise 
from her recruitment onwards; that the employer’s exploitation of the migrant has no parallel 
in the purchaser’s treatment of the stolen goods; and that, in addition to the physical and 
emotional cruelty inherent in it, the employer’s conduct contains a substantial commercial 
element of obtaining domestic assistance without paying for it properly or at all’.147 This 
potentially opens up an avenue to considering the trafficking and exploitation of the domestic 
worker to fall within the ‘commercial or professional activity exception’ to diplomatic 
immunity (Article 31(1)(c) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations).148   
In addition to exploring the interpretation of exceptions to diplomatic immunity, as 
suggested obiter dictum by three judges of the UK Supreme Court in the Reyes v Al Malki 
case,149 other measures could contribute to ensuring redress to victims. The sending State can 
play a key role by cooperating in the investigation and prosecution before the Courts of the 
receiving State and considering waiving the immunity from jurisdiction of public officials 
when there are credible allegations of their involvement in modern slavery.  
The general practice of sending States appears to be cooperation with the investigation 
or at least allowing the cases to proceed without objection.150 In the Soborun case in the US, 
for example, a critical matter was resolved quietly and diplomatically with the cooperation of 
the sending State, Mauritius, which agreed to a waiver from immunity requested by the US.151 
Unfortunately, not all sending States cooperate, as the Khobragade case shows, but this seems 
to be an exception to the rule. In that case, India denied the waiver of immunity requested by 
the US State Department and obstructed the proceedings by transferring its consular agent to 
India’s Mission to the UN to ensure and expand her immunity.152 
2. Providing a tool for accountability 
The application of ARSIWA to State involvement in modern slavery also provides a valuable 
tool for States to put pressure on other States involved in modern slavery and ultimately to 
invoke their responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. These avenues correspond to the 
traditional use of the international law of State responsibility, which enables the international 
community to use sanctions, countermeasures (Article 49 ARSIWA) and the invocation of 
State responsibility as last resort mechanisms ensuring accountability for modern slavery.  
a) Who may invoke State responsibility and in which fora? 
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The responsibility of a State involved in modern slavery may be invoked by an injured State, 
that is, the State to which the breached obligation is due.153 The State of nationality of the 
victims is entitled to invoke responsibility through diplomatic protection, a mechanism which 
can also protect non-nationals, such as refugees or stateless persons, although it has no 
obligation to do so.154 
An injured State is not however the only sovereign actor able to invoke the 
responsibility of another State for breaching its international obligations. Some modern slavery 
obligations are included in treaties ratified by a group of States and are therefore owed to that 
group (obligations erga omnes partes).155 As a consequence, any State Party to those treaties 
would be able to invoke the responsibility of the breaching State. Furthermore, protection from 
slavery is an obligation owed to the whole international community (obligation erga omnes) as 
confirmed by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case,156 and therefore any State could invoke 
a breach of that obligation. The forum is determined by the applicable primary treaty, with this 
section of the ARSIWA acting as the secondary norm establishing the framework for such 
invocation. Article 8 of the 1926 Slavery Convention establishes that any dispute shall be 
settled by direct negotiation and otherwise be referred to the PCIJ. Under Article 10 of the 1956 
Supplementary Convention, negotiation and referral to the ICJ are the dispute settlement 
mechanisms established, unless the parties concerned agree on another mode of settlement. 
Article 15 of the Palermo Protocol also relies on negotiation, arbitration and referral to the ICJ. 
The connection of the ILO Conventions157 with the ICJ is limited to those cases in which a 
complaint results in a report of a Commission of Inquiry: under Article 29 of the ILO 
Constitution, the governments concerned may propose to refer the complaint to the 
International Court of Justice.158  
State responsibility has traditionally been invoked in inter-state litigation. Beyond that 
traditional approach, its use in fora alternative to litigation is not only possible under ARSIWA 
but also increasingly explored in practice. In addition to the promising trend recently initiated 
by human rights courts,159 investment arbitration is the area where ARSIWA are most heavily 
cited.160 The potential of the international law of State responsibility in negotiation, mediation 
or conciliation are worth exploring. Under Article 8 of the 1956 Supplementary Convention, 
States have the obligation to cooperate with each other and with the United Nations to give 
effect to the Convention. The existence of that obligation, and the international responsibility 
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that could derive from its violation, suggests that State responsibility could play an important 
role in encouraging effective settlement of disputes through methods alternative to international 
litigation. 
b) What can ARSIWA forms of reparation offer in the fight against slavery? 
One of the reasons for unpacking the potential of State responsibility in the fight against slavery 
are the advantages offered by the forms of reparations envisaged under ARSIWA. If a State 
commits or facilitates a modern slavery offence, it must repair the damage caused. The 
obligation of reparation is towards a State, although the beneficiary of the obligation may be 
an individual, as the ultimate holder of certain rights.161 In addition, the responsible State may 
be asked to offer assurances of non-repetition162 and it must cooperate with others to bring the 
situation to an end.  
The set of alternatives that ARSIWA provides to ensure that the responsible State 
makes full reparation for the injuries caused163 is a valuable tool for modern slavery cases. The 
first step is to re-establish the status quo ante prior to the concurrence of the wrongful act, 
which can be particularly relevant if the involvement of the State in modern slavery has 
occurred through the adoption of legislation allowing the State to commit labour exploitation, 
or if a decision of a domestic court constitutes the internationally wrongful act.164 
If restitution is not possible, both material and non-material damage may be the subject of a 
claim of compensation,165 the quantification of which has been dealt with by human rights 
bodies.166 Alternatively, when a damage is not financially assessable,167 satisfaction may take 
the form of an acknowledgment of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or 
other appropriate modalities. An example of satisfaction relevant in the context of modern 
slavery is disciplinary or penal action taken by the responsible State against the individuals 
whose conduct caused the internationally wrongful act.168  
Ex-gratia payments, such as the one made by the Tanzanian government to compensate 
a victim of slavery in the Mazengo v Mzengi  case,169 are welcomed as a form of redress to 
those victims. 170 Those payments are usually accompanied by a disclaimer and would not, in 
principle, trigger State responsibility. But if no disclaimer is made, in addition to compensating 
victims those payments could serve for holding States accountable for modern slavery under 
Article 11. Such an approach should be explored with caution to avoid any chilling effect on 
such payments, which provide a measure of redress to the victims even if on a without prejudice 
basis.  
The obligation to cooperate to bring the breach to an end is applicable in this context 
given the peremptory nature of the prohibition of slavery and slave trade171 as well as of the 
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prohibition against torture,172 though there is not yet a consensus on the peremptory nature of 
the prohibitions of forced labour and human trafficking.173 In case of breaching a peremptory 
norm, the responsible State is under the duty to cooperate to bring to an end those serious 
breaches, be it within an institutional framework or in the form of non-institutionalized 
cooperation. The ICJ emphasized this obligation to cooperate in its Advisory Opinion on the 
Chagos Archipelago, stating that ‘the United Kingdom has an obligation to bring to an end its 
administration of the Chagos Archipelago as rapidly as possible, and that all Member States 
must co-operate with the United Nations to complete the decolonization of Mauritius’.174 It is 
also under a double duty of abstention, not to recognize as lawful situations created by such 
serious breach, and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.175  
III. LEGAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Given the patterns identified in the five factual scenarios and the analysis of those patterns 
through the lens of the ARSIWA, the following legal policy recommendations would help 
bridge the gap in accountability for State involvement in modern slavery. Although this is an 
academic article, we include these recommendations because we believe the practice of legal 
scholarship involves the exploration of alternative arrangements, which is an ‘intellectual task 
[that] is active and interventionist and engages the fundamental responsibility of the jurist and 
the citizen’.176 
 
A. Using Existing International Mechanisms to Tackle Modern Slavery 
States are encouraged to: 
i. Co-operate with each other and with the United Nations to give effect to the 1956 
Supplementary Convention. This includes communicating to the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations any measures adopted to implement the Convention. Under Article 
8.3, the Secretary-General shall communicate that information to the other Parties and to 
the ECOSOC as part of the documentation for any discussion which the Council might 
undertake with a view to making further recommendations for the abolition of slavery, 
the slave trade or the institutions and practices which are the subject of the Convention. 
ii. Use the ILO mechanisms in place, particularly the complaint mechanism against member 
States. Non-ILO members are encouraged to accept the obligations of the ILO 
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Constitution and Conventions. Those member States that have not done so yet, are 
encouraged to consider ratifying the ILO Conventions.  
iii. Use existing human rights mechanisms to tackle modern slavery, by addressing structural 
situations and policies (e.g. economic migration) that may create the circumstances for 
unlawful behaviours amounting to modern slavery. The Palermo Protocol, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women or the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child provide mechanisms for inter-state dispute or complaints mechanisms 
that could be used for those purposes.177  
B. Tackling Corruption and Enhancing Monitoring over State-backed Entities to Avoid 
State Responsibility 
States are encouraged to: 
i. Strengthen controls to identify corrupt officials and networks and to set effective 
penalties for corruption in line with the UN Convention against Corruption and to instruct 
public officials on modern slavery and its consequences as part of routine training.  
ii. Increase transparency and monitoring mechanisms in the way government-to-
government Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) for migration of workers are 
negotiated and implemented.  
iii. Implement enhanced monitoring and human rights due diligence in accordance with the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Common 
Approaches, particularly concerning Export Credit Agencies. 
C. Preventing Vulnerability and Ensuring a Way Out for Victims 
States are encouraged to: 
i. Revise visa requirements for overseas domestic workers to provide them a safe way out 
of potentially abusive situations by guaranteeing their right to change employer and by 
allowing them to apply for annual extensions. States with a kafala system are encouraged 
to revise it to protect potential victims of modern slavery, enabling them to change 
employer and leave the country without permission of their employee. All workers 
should enjoy equal protection under domestic labour law.  
ii. Perform human rights impact assessments on any legislation on borders and passport 
controls, in order to reduce vulnerability of victims of trafficking to practices such as 
confiscation of identity documents. 
iii. Prohibit recruitment fees in their domestic law and enhance controls and inspections to 
ensure that employment agencies do not tolerate or use abusive practices; ensure that 
their legal and judicial system guarantees migrant workers’ rights, in particular the right 
to remedy, and that extraterritorial jurisdiction is used to end impunity of companies 
operating abroad; follow the ILO General principles and operational guidelines for fair 
recruitment (2016). 
iv. Follow ILO 201 Recommendation on Decent Work for Domestic Workers and promising 
practices in prevention and protection of victims (OSCE Handbook, US TIP Office and 
DLA Piper Model Contract of Employment178).  
D. Ensuring that Immunity does not Prevent Victims from Obtaining Redress 
States are encouraged to: 
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i. Waive the immunity from jurisdiction of public officials when there are credible 
allegations of their involvement in modern slavery, in the territory of the State or in a 
foreign country. States could require diplomatic missions give a prospective waiver of 
immunity for employment-related disputes when there is a reasonable basis to believe 
that gross violations of human rights of domestic servants could have been committed. 
The vast majority of States will not be content to provide a blanket waiver, so, in order 
to be workable, the waiver should be limited to cases where there are: (i) reasonable 
grounds for believing that (ii) gross human rights violations have been committed (iii) 
against a domestic servant. This would capture the most serious cases and provide a best 
practice model for other jurisdictions to follow, leading to the accumulation of State 
practice.179 Once waiver is provided, States should cooperate with foreign courts’ 
investigations of such allegations by disclosing documents and making personnel 
available for interviews.  
ii. Revise employment laws so that overseas domestic workers in diplomatic households are 
employed by the foreign State. This would allow victims to sue the State instead of the 
diplomat and to benefit from the employment exception to State immunity.180 To avoid 
that service of process becomes a barrier to redress, States may agree to permit channels 
of transmission other than those provided for in the Hague Convention on the Service 
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, such 
as direct communication between respective authorities. 
Domestic courts are encouraged to: 
i. Develop the idea in the UK Supreme Court Reyes v Al-Malki [2017] UKSC 61 to 
interpret the commercial exception to diplomatic immunity in Article 31(1)(c) Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations to cover exploitation of domestic workers. This 
would allow those courts of receiving States to prosecute diplomats in post involved in 
the exploitation of domestic workers and hold them to account. 
ii. Consider the application of exceptions to State immunity from jurisdiction when there 
are credible allegations of the involvement of a public official or body in modern slavery. 
Examples of these exceptions are the commercial activity or territorial tort exceptions to 
State immunity.  
E. Putting Pressure on other States through Sanctions  
States and international organizations such as the UN or the EU are encouraged to: 
i. Consider imposing economic, commercial or other types of sanctions within their 
respective legal frameworks to put pressure on States if there is a sufficiently solid factual 
basis to believe that they are committing modern slavery offences. The decision on the 
adoption of those sanctions should take into consideration any potential collateral effects. 
ii. Consider adopting legislation allowing for targeted sanctions or visa bans on individuals 
who have committed human rights violations in other States.  
F. Invoking State Responsibility and Countermeasures 
States are encouraged to: 
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i. Invoke the responsibility of another State for failing to investigate and prosecute with 
due diligence non-state actors committing modern slavery offences, as well as corrupt 
officials that may facilitate the commission of modern slavery offences (Article 4 
ARSIWA).  
ii. State responsibility may be invoked through diplomatic protection by the State whose 
nationals are victims of modern slavery (Article 42 ARSIWA), or by other States based 
on erga omnes or erga omnes partes obligations (Article 48 ARSIWA).  
iii. Invoke the international responsibility of other States, if they commit an internationally 
wrongful act by engaging in modern slavery (Articles 42 or 48 ARSIWA).  
iv. If the wrongful act constitutes a serious breach of an obligation, States have a positive 
duty to cooperate in order to bring to an end such breach. They also have the obligations 
not to recognize the situation created by the internationally wrongful act and not to render 
aid or assistance in maintaining that situation (Article 41 ARSIWA). 
v. Invoke the international responsibility of a State for aiding or assisting another State in 
the commission of an internationally wrongful act (Article 16 ARSIWA) 
vi. Consider adopting countermeasures (Article 49 ARSIWA) against another State, if the 
latter commits an internationally wrongful act by engaging in modern slavery. Examples 
of possible countermeasures include asset freezes, import restrictions or travel bans.  
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Behind the classic image of the ‘modern slave’ as a construction worker exploited by a private 
company or a vulnerable female migrant working 24/7 in a family home may lurk the State: 
the export credit agency funding the construction project or the diplomat bringing his domestic 
servant to his overseas posting. The focus to date on the role of NSAs in modern slavery is 
important, but it also creates a gap in accountability. This article, and the research project on 
which it is based, seeks to make the role of the State visible – to uncover the gap. There are at 
least five scenarios in which evidence of State involvement in modern slavery could give rise 
to State responsibility. Beyond this, and a potential project for future research, is the possibility 
of modern slavery in public procurement, development aid181 and in conflict situations.182 
The law of State responsibility provides a framework for bridging the accountability 
gap. As the legal policy recommendations presented in this article show, there are many 
existing mechanisms for State responsibility. Many widely-ratified conventions already require 
States to prevent and punish forms of slavery. A State may incur responsibility if it does not 
adequately prevent and punish certain private misconduct subject to a due diligence standard. 
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And the obligations to prevent and punish necessarily imply an obligation not to commit or 
facilitate modern slavery. 
We do not envisage our recommendations triggering a wave of inter-state litigation. 
That remains an infrequent and difficult form of ensuring State responsibility. There are many 
measures that States can take beyond the courtroom, such as exercising vigilance in visa 
processing, enforcing minimum wage rules and border inspections, stamping out corruption, 
and monitoring compliance with laws on living and working conditions, particularly for 
migrant workers.  
The development of strategies to tackle tomorrow’s slavery requires a comprehensive 
understanding of its drivers and risk factors. An important element of that exercise is 
uncovering and bridging the existing gap in accountability for State involvement in modern 
slavery. 
 
